This paper studies the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets (e.g. the market for gastroenterology fellowships and the market for judicial clerks) in the presence of social networks. We o¤er a two-stage model in which workers in training institutions reveal information on their own ability over time. In the early stage, workers receive a noisy signal about their own ability. The early information is 'soft' and non-veri…able, and workers can convey the information credibly only to …rms that are connected to them (potentially via their mentors). At the second stage, 'hard' veri…able (and accurate) information is revealed to the workers and can be credibly transmitted to all …rms. We characterize the e¤ects of changes to the network structure on the unraveling of the market towards early hiring. Moreover, we show that an e¢ cient design of the matching procedure can prevent unraveling. (JEL: A14, D85, C78, L14)
Introduction
The timing of transactions is an important part of a market's activity. In entry-level labor markets, such as the market for judicial clerks or for medical interns, hiring a worker before su¢ cient information is revealed on her quality can lead to ine¢ cient placement of workers.
Nevertheless, law clerks in the US are often hired by judges as early as the fall of their …rst year in law school, medical interns were in some years hired as early as two years prior to their graduation, and NBA teams recently draft high school seniors, skipping the college stage entirely. Roth and Xing (1994) , document several markets that exhibited a process of unraveling towards earlier and earlier contracting dates when market participants repeatedly 'jump the gun'. Unraveling is found to a¤ect the outcomes of markets with respect to both distribution and welfare.
1 Recently, document that workers'mobility decreased during the unraveling in the gastroenterology fellowships market that was triggered by the collapse of the central match. The observation that early hiring is 'more local' than late hiring suggests that locality is not merely driven by the preferences of the workers to stay in the same location as their training institutions, but rather that there is an inherent di¤erence in the way hiring is conducted in di¤erent stages in the workers'training.
The local nature of the hiring process is not surprising. Sociologists and economists have long recognized that many workers …nd their jobs through friends and relatives. 2 It is only natural that social networks a¤ect an inherently connection-based phenomenon such as early hiring. Nevertheless, none of the earlier models of unraveling accounted for the underlying topology of markets that motivate the study of unraveling, whether it is based on geography or on personal connections.
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In this paper, we propose a model in which some …rms and workers are connected -e.g. via personal connections of workers' mentors. Our model consists of two stages in which workers are in training institutions and reveal information on their own ability over time.
In the early stage, workers get a noisy signal about their own ability. The early information is 'soft'and non-veri…able. Thus, workers can convey the information credibly only to …rms that are connected to them, potentially by learning the mentors'impressions of the workers.
At the second stage, 'hard'veri…able (and accurate) information is revealed to the workers and can be credibly transmitted to all of the …rms. Firms that use their connections (and hire promising candidates early) dilute the pool of high quality workers in the second stage.
1 For direct evidence, see and Fréchette, Roth, and Ünver (2007) . 2 See also Granovetter (1974) , Montgomery (1991) , Bewley (1999) , Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) , and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) . 3 For previous theoretical work on unraveling see also Li and Rosen (1998) , Li and Suen (2000) , Suen (2000) , Damiano, Li, and Suen (2005) , Halaburda (2010) , and Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) .
The externality imposed on other …rms triggers a process of unraveling towards more and more …rms using their connections and hiring early.
We model the pattern of connections between workers and …rms as a two-sided (bipartite) network. A connection links a worker with a …rm to which she is able to convey private information credibly at an early stage of her training.
4 Two-sided networks are especially adept to describing market interactions in which the roles are well de…ned as in many labor markets. By studying the e¤ect of changes in the network structure on unraveling we provide a rigorous analysis of changes in information asymmetries in the market and their impact on unraveling. We …nd that di¤erences in the patterns of connections can account for di¤erences in market outcomes, including unraveling. In our comparative statics, we focus on two types of changes to the network structure: [1] changes that correspond to adding or deleting connections from the network; and [2] changes that correspond to changing the distributions of connections across workers and …rms.
There are several ways of adding links to a network. One way is by increasing the span of the network -i.e. by increasing the number of workers and …rms that have at least one connection. Another way is by increasing the network's density -i.e. by increasing the number of connections of workers and …rms that have at least one connection (without changing the network's span). We …nd that increasing the network's density has a non monotonic e¤ect on unraveling. In particular, if a network is su¢ ciently dense then any increase in density leads to lesser unraveling. An immediate implication is that a complete market in an early stage of the workers'training does not generate more unraveling than a networked market. Increasing the span of the network always generates greater unraveling.
We further characterize the e¤ects of redistributing connections across workers and …rms.
If the distribution of the number of connections across …rms is more polarized unraveling is greater (a distribution is more polarized if there is higher density at the tails of the distribution). This is consistent with suggestive evidence from the market for judicial clerks. 4 Di¤erent mechanisms can allow to convey private information credibly over personal connections, e.g. teachers or other recommenders may have personal connections with the hiring entity. Such are the connections between internal medicine departments and gastroenterology departments in the same hospital that potentially allow for transmission of information about interns graduating from internal medicine internships and looking for a gastroenterology fellowship. See also Fainmesser (2010) , Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010) , and Karlan et. al. (2009) for a theoretical analysis of credible information transmission in a network. 5 In the market for judicial clerks, attempts to set the date of the hiring of clerks failed repeatedly. The
The opposite is true for the case that the distribution of the number of connections across workers is more polarized.
We are also interested to answer the following questions: what is the scope of market design in this networked environment? Can a better design of the post-graduation market prevent unraveling? Consistent with much of the evidence from the market design literature, we show that improving the underlying mechanism for matching workers and …rms in labor markets leads to lesser unraveling. To this end, we o¤er a simple parameterization of the e¢ ciency of a market procedure in our setup. We prove that in large markets in which high productivity workers are scarce, our parameterization is supported by a family of matching procedures that follow from activity rules in both centralized and decentralized markets. In particular, this family of matching procedures incorporates most algorithms that are studied in the market design literature (e.g. deferred acceptance, random dictator, top trading cycles,
etc.).
This paper is also related to the literature on networks in economics. Calvo-Armengol Galeotti et. al. (2010) suggest that in network games the analysis is simpli…ed if players are assumed to hold incomplete knowledge of the network structure.
This simpli…cation cannot be directly applied to our setup because a …rm cares not only about the actions taken by its neighbors, but also about the aggregate outcome in the market which depends on the actions of all of the …rms and workers in the market as well as on the entire network structure. Nevertheless, we show that if there are many workers and many …rms and if the network is formed with a su¢ ciently salient random component, the assumption that workers and …rms have incomplete knowledge of the network structure can 9th Circuit (California) is often claimed to be the one to unravel …rst. The reasons for this are under debate: the 9th Circuit judges point out that the East Coast judges have a geographical advantage as they are close to more top-ranked law schools, suggesting that a close connection to candidates matters, and that it is di¢ cult to prevent unraveling in the presence of a skewed distribution of the …rms'degrees. See also Avery et. al. (2001) and (2007) .
simplify the analysis signi…cantly. This is possible due to recent graph theoretic results by Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010) who study repeated games in large two-sided networks.
The large network approach leads to an analysis that has the ‡avor of a mean-…eld approximation that is often assumed to approximate discrete and stochastic processes by a continuous and deterministic process (see Jackson and Rogers 2007 for an example used in the analysis of network formation). In particular, we approximate the number of workers hired early via the network. However, as we are interested in equilibrium behavior, we take a more explicit approach that provides bounds on the quality of the approximation and allows us to derive the …rms'and workers'best response correspondences.
Finally, our model is di¤erent both in approach and in predictions from earlier models of unraveling. In particular, previous contributions focus on the heterogeneity of …rms and candidates with respect to quality Rosen 1998, Li and Suen 2000) and preferences (Halaburda 2010) , and on the size of the applicant pool (Li and Rosen 1998) . We share with previous models the insurance element driving the unraveling process, and an agreement that unraveling lowers the e¢ ciency in markets.
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In the following three sections we lay out the model and de…ne the best response correspondences for workers and …rms. In section 5, we characterize the structure of the equilibria in our model and de…ne a notion of equilibrium stability that captures the dynamic nature of unraveling. In particular, our equilibrium analysis relies on an important approximation result that is reviewed in section 5. In sections 6 and 7 we derive comparative statics on unraveling with respect to the network structure and the matching procedure and discuss the impact of unraveling on market outcomes. Section 8 o¤ers concluding remarks.
A simple model of employment
There is a …nite set of …rms, F f1; 2; :::; n f g, and a …nite set of workers, W f1; 2; :::; n w g.
Each worker w 2 W can work for at most one …rm and each …rm f 2 F can employ at most one worker. A worker w is characterized by a productivity level q w 2 fL; Hg. We assume that production depends only on the workers' productivities and normalize wages to zero (assuming a …xed wage is consistent with the markets motivating this paper and can also be substituted, with some technical burden, with milder restrictions).
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The payo¤ of …rm f from employing worker w is captured by (1). In the following section we introduce heterogeneity to …rms'payo¤s.
Workers have idiosyncratic preferences over …rms. Speci…cally, let worker w's utility be:
where for every w and f , wf 2 [ ; ] for some 2 (0; 1). A …rm that does not employ any worker, and a worker that is unemployed have a payo¤ of 0.
The hiring process
In this section, we describe the process of hiring in the market. We start by an overview of the two stages of the workers' training during which they can be hired. Later, we review separately the details of the hiring process within each stage.
There are two stages in the workers' training, S = 1 and S = 0. At stage S = 1 workers are in training institutions (i.e. law school, medical school, internship programs, etc.) and cannot yet be employed. At S = 0, workers graduate from their studies and are ready to be employed.
Before stage S = 1 nature assigns each worker with a productivity level q w = H or 7 Judicial clerks'wages are determined by federal law. Medical residents'wages are limited to a small number of wage steps. In particular, in the gastroenterology fellowships market, Roth (2003,2005) do not …nd any e¤ect of unraveling on wages. 8 The discussion of the role of wages in the analysis of unraveling is not new. Models of matching markets can be analyzed using the assignment model (Koopmans and Beckmann 1957, Shapley and Shubik 1971) where wages are a part of the clearing mechanism, or using the marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962) where wages are assumed out. Li and Suen (2000) , who analyze unraveling using the assignment model in the context of college admissions, admit that "our [assignment model] analysis applies with a greater force to assignment markets in which payments transfers are explicitly negotiated". q w = L with equal probability, and preferences f wf g f 2F that are drawn from a distribution H with mean 0 and positive density in every point in the support [ ; ] where 2 (0; 1).
The realizations of q w and f wf g f 2F are independent of each other and across workers.
Workers and …rms do not observe q w and f wf g f 2F but will learn about them over time as described below.
We now describe intuitively the two stages of the training and hiring. In stage S = 1, each worker w learns her own preferences f wf g f 2F .
9 In addition, worker w and her mentors receive a noisy signal of her productivity (s w ). The noisy signal s w consists of 'soft' information (in-class exam grades, reinforcements from teachers, etc.). In particular, there is no o¢ cial document or public track record that allows worker w to prove that she received a given signal. However, the worker's mentors have pre-existing connections with a subset of the …rms that allow for the credible transmission of workers'signals to these …rms. If …rm f and at least one of the mentors of worker w are connected, f learns s w accurately at stage S = 1. Since mentors do not have a strategic role in our model, we say that a worker w and a …rm f are connected if one of the mentors of worker w is connected with …rm f . Firm f is not able to learn wf for any worker w.
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At the end of stage S = 1, each …rm f can make an o¤er to at most one worker, and a worker that receives at least one o¤er can accept one of the o¤ers or reject all. If a worker w accepts an o¤er from a …rm f , both w and f leave the market and w works for f starting at stage S = 0.
In stage S = 0, worker w and her mentors receive veri…able information that indicates accurately the worker's productivity (q w ) (transcripts, publications, etc.). Thus, q w can be credibly transmitted to all …rms. We explore a family of matching procedures governing the labor market in stage S = 0. If a worker w and a …rm f are matched, w works for f starting 9 Assuming that a worker learns her preferences for a …rm only upon receiving an o¤er from that …rm does not change the analysis. 10 There may be several reasons why …rm f is not able to learn wf for worker w. First, a worker may strategically transmit her preferences to her mentor. Second, mentors are likely to be able to misrepresent workers'preferences without being penalized by …rms in the future. The reason for the latter is unmodelled in this paper. Informally, mentors are less likely to be held accountable by …rms for misrepresenting workers' preferences for several reasons: [1] mentors are not expected to be able to elicit workers' preferences; [2] information on preference is rich f wf g f 2F and cannot be transmitted easily; and [3] the relation between wf and outcomes that are observable by the …rm (acceptance or rejection of an o¤er) depend on several unobserved variables, e.g. which other o¤ers the worker received.
at stage S = 0.
Stage S = 1: early hiring
We now describe formally stage S = 1 of the workers training, including the information available to workers, the network between …rms and workers, and the process of early hiring.
At stage S = 1, information about own productivity and preferences is revealed to the workers in the following way: worker w observes a signal s w ; f wf g f 2F where f wf g f 2F are the worker's preferences and s w 2 fh; lg is a noisy signal of the worker's productivity. If worker w has productivity q w = H she receives a signal s w = h with probability 2 1 2 ; 1 and a signal s w = l with probability (1 ). For ease of notation assume that if worker w has productivity q w = L she has the reversed probabilities over her signal s w . The realizations of the signals are independent across workers.
For each worker w there exists a set of …rms N w F that can learn s w . Denote by N f W the set of workers such that …rm f can learn fs w g w2N f . Firms cannot learn wf for any worker w.
After learning fs w g w2N f , each …rm can make at most one o¤er. Firm f can make an o¤er to worker w independent of whether w 2 N f or not. Each worker w can then choose to accept one o¤er or none. If …rm f makes an o¤er to worker w and worker w accepts, both commit that after graduation (at stage S = 0) w will be employed by f . The commitment is binding and both w and f exit the labor market.
We assume further that …rm f incurs a cost c f for hiring at stage S = 1, and let c f be drawn from a distribution with a continuous cumulative distribution function D (c; c), independently across …rms. There are two potential (unmodelled) sources for the cost: [1] early commitment of funding that leads to a reduction in the …rm's liquidity, 11 and [2] repugnance -in some entry level labor markets, such as the gastroenterology fellowship market and the market for judicial clerkships, …rms are publicly objecting to early hiring.
11 During the economic downturn of 2008-2010, employment contracts of freshly minted MBA's were canceled at a (potentially reputational) cost to the hiring …rms. In the absence of a global …nancial crisis a …rm that su¤ers from …nancial di¢ culties might incur even a greater cost because the cancellation cannot be attributed to market-wide economic recession.
Thus, hiring early might lead to loss of goodwill.
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Finally, we assume that
Given that a worker's ex-ante probability of having high productivity is 1 2 , condition (3) guarantees that a …rm f does not hire a worker w if f has no (or negative) information about the productivity of w.
To summarize, the timeline of the early labor market in stage S = 1 is as follows:
1. Each worker w observes a noisy signal s w . Each …rm f 2 N w learns s w .
2. Each …rm f makes an o¤er to at most one worker w 2 W [ fw 0 g. We say that a …rm makes an o¤er to worker w 0 if the …rm does not make any o¤er.
3. Each worker w who received at least one o¤er decides whether to accept an o¤er or not. Worker w can accept at most one o¤er.
4. If …rm f makes an o¤er to worker w and worker w accepts, both exit the labor market and worker w is employed by …rm f starting at stage S = 0:
Remark 1 Two assumptions deserve additional discussion. First, the assumption that each …rm can make at most one o¤er is a simpli…cation of the idea that the number of o¤ers that each …rm can make early is limited. In many markets, this results from the hiring norms and technology prior to graduation. The market for Gastroenterology fellowships provides an example. During the period before the match, departments try to hide from each other the fact that they are making early o¤ers. 13 Making many early o¤ers might expose a department's early hiring attempts before the department is able to hire. As a result, departments might try 12 The discussion against practices of early hiring and exploding o¤ers in the judicial clerkships market were especially …erce. For a controversial defense of the common practice of early exploding o¤ers, see Kozinski (1991) .
13 This is demonstrated in the following E-mail sent by Debbie Proctor, the gastroenterologist who took the lead in reorganizing the match, to the economists assisting in redesigning the Gastroenterology fellowships market:
"I'm answering 3-4 emails per day especially on this issue. 'I want to make sure MY competition is in the match and that they don't cheat.' Well, this is another way of saying that if they cheat, then I will too!...Have you ever seen this before? The distrust amongst program directors? I …nd it hard to believe that we are unique. Maybe this is [a] social science phenomenon?". See also Niederle and Roth (2009) .
to make few o¤ers that are likely to be accepted. An additional example of a di¤erent ‡avor is provided by the market for new MBA graduates. At Harvard Business School, periods in which students are available for interviews are dictated by the school and …rms are not allowed to invite students for interview during the semester. This puts a bound on the number of interviews a …rm can make at every stage. Since an interview is required prior to making an o¤er, this restricts the number of early o¤ers.
A second assumption is that an early agreement between a …rm and a worker is binding 
Networks and information
If …rm f is able to learn s w (f 2 N w and w 2 N f ) we say that f and w are connected.
We note that the sets of …rms, workers, and connections (links) induce a network. We now describe the network structure, as well as …rms' and workers' knowledge and beliefs with respect to the network structure.
We are mainly interested in large markets. It is by now widely accepted that in large networks: [1] the underlying process of network formation has a strong stochastic element, and [2] some aggregate characteristics of the network structure, such as the distribution of the numbers of connections, are usually consistent across networks and time. Thus, we assume that before stage S = 1, fN w g w2W and fN f g f 2F are determined by a random process that is described below. Firms and workers know the random process of network formation, but do not have complete knowledge of the network. Instead, a worker w (…rm f ) observes only N w (N f ). Both assumptions …t well the labor markets motivating this paper and can be relaxed at the cost of added technical burden.
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We now describe formally workers' and …rms' knowledge of the network: we capture the network of connections between workers and …rms with a graph G hF; W; Ei, where E F W is the set of connections (edges) between …rms and workers. The degree of worker w (…rm f ) is the number of connections of worker w (…rm f ):
Let W (r) ( F (r)) be the fraction of workers (…rms) in the market with degree r for r = 0; 1; 2; :::1. Note that specifying n w , W (r), and F (r) implies a unique n f that is consistent with a graph G. Thus, we omit n f and let G (n w ; W ; F ) be the set of networks consistent with (n w ; W ; F ).
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We assume that before stage S = 1 the network is chosen from G (n w ; W ; F ) uniformly at random (u.a.r.) and that worker w (…rm f ) knows: [1] the number of workers and …rms in the market n w and n f ; [2] the set N w (N f ); and [3] W and F . We also note that the Bayesian posterior of worker w (…rm f ) with degree r puts identical probability on all networks in G (n w ; W ; F jr w = r) (G (n w ; W ; F jr f = r)). We denote by G (n w ; W ; F j ) a member of G (n w ; W ; F j ) that is chosen u.a.r.
Some …rms and workers might have no connections (r = 0). To describe changes to the network structure that do not involve such buyers and sellers we use a modi…ed degree distribution P . Formally, let P (r; W ) be the fraction of workers with degree r as a fraction of the workers that have positive degrees and note that
15 In section 5.1 we o¤er a dynamic model in which the hiring process is repeated with subsequent graduating cohorts in subsequent hiring cycles and discuss further the motivation for the random process of the formation of the network. 16 The idea that workers and …rms have incomplete knowledge of the network …ts well the labor markets motivating this paper. For example, a …rm might know several mentors, but might not know the students of these mentors and their other mentors as these change across graduating cohorts and hiring cycles. Similarly worker w might have several mentors and know which …rms they are connected to, but may not know how well connected each of these …rms are.
17 For any …xed n w , W , and F there exists an in…nite strictly increasing sequence of integers fn w g s.t. G (n w ; W ; F ) 6 = ; (see Greenhill et. al. 2006 ). All statements should be read as holding only for n w s.t. the aforementioned set is non-empty.
The de…nition immediately extend to P (r; F ).
Scarcity of high productivity workers
Many of the labor markets that motivate this paper are markets for highly skilled workers (e.g. lawyers, physicians, psychologists). In such markets, the number of high quality workers is usually smaller than the market saturation level.
De…nition 1 We say that h W ; F ; i exhibits scarcity of high productivity workers if for every hG; i such that G 2 G (n w ; W ; F ) there exists > 1 such that, n f > 1 2 n w .
De…nition 1 includes all markets in which there are not many more workers than open positions. In particular, we show later that De…nition 1 guarantees that in markets that exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, the number of high productivity workers that are still looking for employment at stage S = 0 is always smaller than the number of …rms that are looking for a worker at stage S = 0.
Stage S = 0: graduation
We now describe formally stage S = 0, which we also call the post-graduation market. We de…ne and parameterize a family of market mechanisms on which we focus.
At stage S = 0 workers graduate from their training and obtain a diploma and a track record that contain veri…able information that reveals their true qualities fq w g w2W . At this stage, fq w g w2W are common knowledge, but the preferences of any worker w f wf g f 2F
are still her private information. In this environment, the network is obsolete and we are in a familiar setup of a one-to-one matching market.
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The market design literature shows that the outcome in a matching market depends heavily on the underlying market rules. 19 Since we are also interested in how changes in the post-graduation market a¤ect early hiring, we consider a class of matching procedures that includes many of the matching procedures studied in the market design literature.
Intuitively, a matching procedure is a function from sets of workers and …rms to a probability distribution over a set of matchings. We focus on matching procedures that are anonymous -i.e. take into considerations the workers'and …rms preferences but not their identities; and that put positive probability only on stable matchings -i.e. matchings that guarantee that no …rm and worker that are matched prefer to stay unmatched and no worker and …rm that would like to be matched to each other remain unmatched. 20 The requirement that a matching procedure be anonymous excludes matching procedures in which there is an ad-hoc reason that some …rms and workers are matched at stage S = 0.
The formal de…nition of an anonymous matching procedure that guarantees stable matchings builds on de…nitions from matching theory and is deferred to the Appendix. Instead,
we present now the main result of this section and discuss its implications for the modeling of stage S = 0.
Let W 0 q be the set of workers with productivity q that reach S = 0 unmatched and let F 0 be the set of …rms that reach S = 0 unmatched. Given G and , and given a matching procedure M denote by E G;M; [u w jq] the expected utility of worker w 2 W Lemma 1 shows that the requirement that a matching procedure is anonymous and guarantees a stable matching pins down a unique expected payo¤ for all …rms that participate in the post-graduation market. Moreover, the expected utility of high productivity workers who reach stage S = 0 unmatched is asymptotically independent of the hiring at stage S = 1. Therefore, the expected utility of high productivity workers can be varied exogenously by the choice of the particular matching procedure without a¤ecting the expected payo¤s of …rms.
Lemma 1 Let h W ; F ; i exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, and let b G ( W ; F ; n w ) be any network that is consistent with W ; F and n w . Assume further that no worker who 20 In the matching literature, stability of a matching also requires that no …rm-worker pair prefers to be matched to each other rather than to the partner that they are assigned with. However, in our model, this requirement is obsolete because …rms have identical preferences over workers.
receives a low signal in stage S = 1 is hired early (in stage S = 1 ) and let c W 0
L ; F 0 that are possible under these assumptions. Then, 1. Given any anonymous matching procedure M that guarantees a stable matching:
2. For every 2 [0; 1] and for every > 0 there exists an anonymous matching procedure M that guarantees a stable matching such that
We show later that it is always true that no worker who receives a low signal in stage S = 1 is hired early (in stage S = 1). Thus, Lemma 1 applies throughout our analysis. While the result is of interest on its own, we only use Lemma 1 to motivate exogenous variations in , and to establish that all of the market procedures that we focus on lead to identical
The following de…nition o¤ers a parameterization for the family of market procedures that our analysis covers.
De…nition 2 A matching procedure M is parameterized by M 2 R if:
[1] M is anonymous and guarantees a stable matching, and
[2] for all G 2 G (n w ; W ; F ) and for any W 0 H , W 0 L , and F 0 that are possible under the assumption that no worker who receives a low signal in stage S = 1 is hired (in stage S = 1), the expected utility of a high productivity worker in the post-graduation market is asymptotically 1 + M . Namely,
We interpret M as a continuous measure of the e¢ ciency of the market rules.
Bayesian equilibrium and "-equilibrium
We now de…ne the notions of Bayesian equilibrium and "-equilibrium in our setup. Note that non trivial strategic decisions are made only at stage S = 1: …rms decide who to make o¤ers to, and workers decide which o¤ers to accept.
A strategy of a …rm f is a mapping f :
is the set of all subsets of workers and (W [ fw 0 g) is the set of all probability distributions on W [ fw 0 g. Thus, f c; N f ; f W h is a mixed strategy of …rm f with a cost of hiring early c f = c, set of workers connected to it N f , and that learned that every worker w 2 f W h N f received a signal s w = h (and that every worker w 2 N f n f W h received a signal s w = l). The …rm's mixed strategy is over the workers to which the …rm makes an o¤er at stage S = 1 ( f ( ) = w 0 implies that …rm f does not make an o¤er at stage S = 1). For brevity, when it is clear from the context we let f f
A family of …rms'strategies that is especially natural in our context includes strategies in which …rms ignore the names (or labels) of the workers and make their o¤ers based only on the economically meaningful attributes of the workers. Formally, De…nition 3 Consider a …rm f with c; N f ; f W h . We say that f is a label-free strategy if f c; N f ; f W h assigns identical probabilities to any w and w 0 for whom at least ONE of the following holds:
A strategy for worker w is a mapping w : fh; lg [ ; ]
). Thus, w s w ; f wf g f 2F ; N w ; e F w is a mixed strategy of worker w that receives a signal s w , has preferences that are captured by f wf g f 2F , a set of …rms connected to her N w , and o¤ers from every …rm f 2 e F w at stage S = 1. For brevity, when it is clear from the context we let w e F w = w s w ; f wf g f 2F ; N w ; e F w .
For given network G, market procedure M , and signal accuracy , let G;M; (f ) =
be the expected payo¤ of …rm f that employs
be the expected utility of worker w who employs strategy w . We are now ready to de…ne equilibrium and "-eqilibrium in our setup.
De…nition 4 The vectors of strategies f f g f 2F and f w g w2W are an "-equilibrium if for all
f; e f ; c f ; N f ; f f 0 g f 0 2F nff g ; f w 0 g w 0 2W ; " and for all e w 2 supp ( w ), w 2 W :
"
If " = 0 the de…nition amounts to a Bayesian equilibrium in our setup. We now analyze …rms and workers best response functions separately and show that they can be summarized using two random variables.
If a …rm f makes an o¤er at stage S = 1 to a worker w that receives a signal s w = h:
and if …rm f does not make an o¤er at stage S = 1:
Note that P r fw acceptsg, P r fw rejectsg, and
. On the other hand, P r
pendent of the strategies employed by all …rms and workers.
Now consider a worker w that receives early job o¤ers (stage S = 1) from a set of …rms e F w F . If w accepts the o¤er of …rm f 2 e F w then U G;M; j e F w ; w ; e F w = f = 1 + wf and otherwise we conclude that equilibrium behavior depends on the network structure only through its e¤ect on the number of …rms and of high productivity workers that arrive at stage S = 0 unmatched.
Formally, let be the fraction of workers hired at stage S = 1. Then both of the following hold:
1. Consider a …rm f . Conditional on f W h 6 = ; and on the expectation that = 1 , the probability that f makes an o¤er at stage S = 1 depends on c f and is captured by
Consider a worker w. Conditional on = 1 and on w receiving exactly one job o¤er at stage S 1, the probability that w accepts the o¤er depends on f wf g f 2F and is captured by
Similarly, a worker that received exactly m o¤ers at stage S = 1 accepts an o¤er with probability 1 1 G;M; ( ) m , and conditional on accepting an o¤er, worker w picks the o¤er that maximizes f1 + wf g f 2 e Fw .
Expression 5 is surprising because it establishes that in any equilibrium, for any given …rm f , conditional on 1 and as long as f W h 6 = ;, G( W ; F ;nw);M; r; f W h ; 1 is independent of r; f W h , and n w and depends on the network structure only via W ; F . Condition 5 also captures the observation that the incentives of …rms to make o¤ers at stage S = 1 increase in the fraction of workers hired at stage S = 1. A complete derivation of (5) and (6) is deferred to the Appendix.
Equilibrium existence and structure
In this section we show that equilibrium in our setup corresponds to a …xed point of a mapping from the fraction of workers hired at stage S = 1 to itself, and …nd that in large networks, "-equilibria exist for arbitrary low ". Moreover, when …rms employ label-free strategies, the set of equilibria is fully characterized as the set of …xed points of a simple function.
Let b 0 be a random variable that describes the (common and rational) expectations of any network G, G;M; ( ) is complicated as it depends on the entire network structure and its outcome is stochastic even conditional on the network structure. In particular, for any network with more than a few workers and …rms, a closed form expression for G;M; ( ) is prohibitively complicated.
Instead of trying to characterize G;M; ( ) directly, we establish that in (asymptotically) large networks and for every h W ; F ; M; i, G(nw; W ; F );M; ( 0 ) converges to a well behaved function with a deterministic output. As a result, we are able to characterize "-equilibria for arbitrarily small ".
We now illustrate our analysis using a simple exercise: suppose that there was no correlation between the degrees of …rms and workers that are connected -i.e. if we choose a worker w 2 W u.a.r. and then choose a …rm f 2 N w u.a.r., then the probability that r f = r is independent of r w and captured by e P (r; F ) = P (r; F ) r r f where r f = E P [r f jr f 1] = P r2f1;2;:::1g P (r; F ) r. Now consider a worker w chosen u.a.r. The probability that worker w receives a job o¤er from a …rm f that is chosen u.a.r. from
To see why, note that is the conditional probability that f makes the o¤er to w. Given that the realizations of the signals, the o¤ers received and the acceptance of o¤ers are independent across workers, if the matching procedure M is parameterized by M , the expected number of workers hired in stage S = 1 is captured by e W ; F ;M; ( ) = 
where
The calculation of e W ; F ;M; ( ) above follows a naive counting exercise. Namely, it is equivalent to going over all of the workers, one by one, and evaluating their probabilities of receiving at least one acceptable early o¤er. Note that e W ; F ;M; ( ) is deterministic and well behaved. Thus, establishing more generally that for any 2 [0; 1] and > 0,
allows us to characterize the equilibrium structure in large networks. Formally, De…nition 5 we say that 2 [0; 1] is a 0-equilibrium in large networks (or simply 0-equilibrium) with h W ; F ; M; i if for every " > 0 there exists n w 2 Z + such that for every n 0 w > n w there exists an "-equilibrium with G (n w ; W ; F ) ; M; in which
Theorem 1 characterizes the set of 0-equilibria as the set of solutions for a …xed point problem in e W ; F ;M; ( ). In Lemma 4, which is deferred to the Appendix, we derive a limit closed form expression for G;M; (b ) without formally expressing G;M; (b ) for any …nite network G. To this end, we rely on a recent graph theoretic result by Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010) that implies that in a network that is chosen u.a.r. conditional on a degree distribution, as the network grows, the degree correlation goes to zero. We then apply the law of large numbers to conclude that the fraction of worker hired at stage S = 1 converges to the mean and that (8) holds.
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the analysis of 0-equilibria in regular environments in which Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 apply. 
Unraveling
In this section we de…ne unraveling as a dynamic process in which …rms and workers that hire early (at stage S = 1) trigger a response from other …rms and workers, and the fraction of workers hired early increases. We also provide a de…nition of greater unraveling that is adept for environments with multiple equilibria.
Consider an entry level labor market in which new cohorts of workers graduate in di¤erent hiring cycles (e.g. years) and …rms hire new workers in every hiring cycle. For simplicity, assume that all cohorts of workers are of the same size n w . The hiring process in each hiring cycle follows stages S = 1; 0 that are described above. The network of connection is re-drawn in each period u.a.r. from all of the possible networks with the same W and F . To motivate the changes to the network structure, recall that the network is de…ned by the connections of the di¤erent subsets of mentors that each worker has. As the set of workers varies across periods, so does the network. However, as we are motivated by large markets, we follow the observation that large networks tend to maintain some aggregate characteristics constant even as the network undergo local changes. The assumptions that the network is selected u.a.r. and that W and F stay exactly the same can be relaxed.
In this dynamic environment, consider an unraveling process governed by myopic best responses. At hiring cycle t = 0, an arbitrary fraction 0 of the workers (all with s w = h) is hired at stage S = 1. At each hiring cycle t > 0, each agent best responds to the outcome of the play in hiring cycle t 1. Let t denote the fraction of the workers (all with s w = h) that are hired at stage S = 1 in hiring cycle t, then and any rest point of of the system correspond to a static Bayesian equilibrium. Following (8) and has a positive slope for every 2 [0; 1]. Hence, from any starting point, the convergence of the limiting dynamic process is monotone, either upwards or downwards.
A dynamic process of unraveling, in which the market participants modify their strategies based on the previous hiring cycle's outcomes, captures the dynamics in some well studied labor markets (see Roth and Xing 1994 and references therein) and suggestive evidence from the experimental market design literature (see also Kagel and Roth 2000) . Moreover, considering the process of unraveling as dynamic lends itself to a natural way of capturing the notion that some markets generate greater unraveling then other markets. Proposition 1 is surprising as it establishes that unraveling is not maximized when the network is very dense or in the well studied complete market. In particular, Proposition 1 highlights the role of the network in the unraveling process. In markets in which early information di¤usion is not based on personal connections we would expect lower levels of unraveling than in some markets in which connections are important.
The forces that generate the non monotonicity suggested by Proposition 1 are demonstrated in …gure 1. Figure 1: Consider two markets with two …rms and two workers as depicted in …gure 1a and 1b. Assume that one of the …rms has a very low cost of hiring early and that the other …rm has a very high cost of hiring early. Assume further that only one of the workers receives a signal s w = h. Then, in the network in …gure 1b the …rm with the low costs of hiring will make an early o¤er to the high signal worker, whereas in …gure 1a there is a positive probability that the high signal worker is not connected to the …rm with the low early hiring costs, and therefore no early o¤ers will be made. Now assume that both …rms have very low costs of hiring early, and that both workers receive a signal s w = h. Then the network in …gure 1a guarantees that both workers will receive early o¤ers, whereas in the network in …gure 1b there is a positive probability that both …rms make an early o¤er to the same worker.
More generally, increasing the network's density increases the probability that a worker w with s w = h and a …rm with low enough c f are connected. This leads to an increase in the number of o¤ers made in stage S = 1, as captured by the increase in e W ; F ;M; ( ) for any e W ; F ;M; ( ). On the other hand, increasing the network's density increases the probability that fewer workers receive a larger portion of the o¤ers, as a worker cannot accept more than one o¤er, this leads to a lower level of unraveling. This is captured by a decrease in . The probability that a worker receives at least one o¤er at stage S = 1 is increasing and concave in r w and so is the probability that a worker receives at least one acceptable o¤er . The probability that a …rm f makes an o¤er to a worker w that is connected to it W ; F ;M; ( ) (1 0:5 r f ) = (0:5 r f ) is decreasing and convex in r f . Therefore, 
Market rules and the accuracy of early information
In this section we study the e¤ect of changing the post-graduation matching procedure via changes to M and the e¤ect of changing the accuracy of early signals available to the workers at stage S = 1 via changes to .
The post-graduation matching procedure' s quality ( M ). The following result shows that increasing M leads to lesser unraveling, providing yet an additional motivation for the design of more statically-e¢ cient markets. The connection between the matching procedure in the post-graduation market and the level of unraveling in a market were recognized in empirical and experimental work in market design. For example, Kagel and Roth (2000) examine the e¤ect of the mechanism used in the post graduation market on the ability of the market to recover from unraveling. Kagel and Roth …nd that "when the centralized mechanisms are introduced, there is only a small rollback of the unraveling that developed when the market was decentralized. But because of the congestion and competition in the market, some …rms and workers who intend to make early matches …nd themselves unable to do so, and these participate in the centralized mechanism." As a result, Kagel and Roth conclude, …rms and workers …nd out that the matching procedure improved and that they can do better by not hiring early.
The accuracy of the early signal ( ). If is higher a worker w with s w = h has a higher probability of being q w = H. Thus w is more likely to reject o¤ers at stage S = 1.
For the same reason, a …rm f 2 N w is more likely to make an o¤er to w at stage S = 1.
These two forces result in a non monotonic relationship between and the unraveling level in the market. 
If is very small, a worker w that receives at least one early o¤er accepts one of the o¤ers with probability 1. Thus, a small increase in only increases the probability that a …rm makes an early o¤er to a worker w with s w = h, and for every 2 [0; 1], W ; F ;M; 2 ( ) W ; F ;M; 1 ( ). On the other hand, if is large, a …rm that is connected to at least one worker w such that s w = h makes an early o¤er with probability 1. Thus, a further increase in only decreases the probability that worker w accepts, and e W ; F ;M; 2 e W ; F ;M; 1 .
Remark 2 Worker-and …rm-driven unraveling.
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In many entry-level labor markets, information about workers becomes more accurate over time. Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that the time that workers spend in the training institutions can be divided into two time segments: early on, is small and workers would accept any job o¤er in order to insure themselves against unemployment. As a result, W ; F ;M; ( ) 2 [0; 1] whereas e W ; F ;M; = 1. This worker-driven unraveling can be more easily in ‡uenced by changes to …rms' incentives, as the incentives of workers to contract early are too strong to be a¤ected. Closer to graduation, is large, and the balance of power shifts; …rms try to hire any high potential worker, whereas workers decline less desirable job o¤ers (for all 2 [0; 1], W ; F ;M; ( ) = 1 whereas e W ; F ;M; 2 [0; 1]). This …rm-driven unraveling can be more easily in ‡uenced by policies that a¤ect workers' incentives. Determining whether stage S = 1 is dominated by worker-or …rm-driven unraveling depends on the market of interest.
Unraveling and market outcomes
Welfare analysis for two-sided matching markets is subtle as there is an inherent trade-o¤ between the gain of one agent and the loss of other agents on the same side of the market.
Nevertheless, we are able to make the following observations. Corollary 2 :
(1) Greater unraveling leads to higher aggregate utility of connected workers P w2fw2W jrw 1g u w . (2) Greater unraveling leads to lower aggregate payo¤s of …rms
The …rst claim captures the insurance that unraveling provides to connected workers.
The second claim points out that unraveling leads to the hiring of low productivity workers and reduces aggregate …rms'pro…ts. Evaluating aggregate welfare changes in the economy as a whole requires further assumptions about the outside options of workers and …rms.
The idea that unraveling makes some workers better o¤, and that a centralized match can hinder unraveling (Proposition 4) helps to account for observed resistance to a match by groups of individual workers. For example, the match for medical interns to internships was under scrutiny when an anti-trust suit against the National Residency Matching Program 
Conclusion
This paper is a …rst attempt to tackle the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets in the presence of social networks connecting employers and potential workers. To this end, we propose a model of local interaction in which information ‡ows via connections in a network. While the idea that social networks are used as a mean of transferring information, and in particular information related to job search, is widely accepted in the economic literature, it has not yet been incorporated into the analysis of the timing of hiring in labor markets. Our model provides a …rst step in this direction.
In our model, the incentives of …rms to make early o¤ers depend on the aggregate level of early hiring which in turn depends on the entire network structure in complex ways. Thus, a …rm's best response depend on the …rm's beliefs with respect to the entire network structure.
To overcome that we provide formal analysis of …rms beliefs in large networks that are chosen at random and combine tools from graph theory, matching theory, and market design.
We …nd that the structure of the network a¤ects unraveling in systematic ways. Moreover, we show that improving the design of the post-graduation market by improving the quality of the match between workers and …rms leads to lesser unraveling.
Appendix

Matching procedures -de…nitions
In the absence of a meaningful network, the analysis of stage S = 0 lends itself to the more familiar analysis of one-to-one matching markets. Formally, let w 0 and f 0 be the null worker and …rm.
De…nition 8 (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) For a set of workers W 0 and a set of …rms F 0 , a one-to-one matching is a function M :
either M (w) 2 F 0 or M (w) = f 0 , and
Much of the matching literature focuses on …xed exogenous sets of workers and …rms with perfect information. In our environment, the sets of workers and …rms that reach stage
L , and F 0 ) are determined endogenously in stage S = 1 and we are required to de…ne a notion of a matching procedure. Intuitively, a matching procedure captures the rules of the market which in turn determine the mapping from sets of workers and …rms to a probability distribution over matchings.
Denote the set of all subsets of a set A (the power set of set A) by P (A).
De…nition 9 Let M (W 0 ; F 0 ) be the set of all one-to-one matchings over W 0 and F 0 , and let M (W 0 ; F 0 ) be the set of all probability distributions on elements of M (W 0 ; F 0 ). A matching procedure is a function M :
We now de…ne the notions of anonymous matching procedures and of matching procedures that guarantee a stable matching. ; :::; u 00 w jW 0 j be a pro…le of workers'utility functions such that there exist two …rms f 0 and f 00 such that: (1) for every j, u w j (f 0 ) = u 00 w j (f 00 ) and u w j (f 00 ) = u 00 w j (f 0 ); and (2) for every f 2 F n ff 0 ; f 00 g and for every j, u w j (f ) = u 00 w j (f ). A matching procedure is anonymous if for every W 0 W and F 0 F and in every matching M that has a positive probability given the matching procedure the following holds:
25 A matching procedure is anonymous if it depends only on the preferences of workers' and …rms' and not on their labels or position in the network. As …rms' payo¤ functions are identical at stage S = 0, an anonymous matching procedure will depend only on the workers'preferences as captured by the de…nition.
for any w
De…nition 11 A matching procedure guarantees a stable matching if for every W 0 and F 0 and in every matching M that has a positive probability given the matching procedure the following holds: [1] for any w 2 W 0 and f 2 F 0 such that
f ( jM (f ) = w 0 ) (for any matched worker and …rm, both prefer to be matched to the other than be unmatched); and [2] for any w 2 W 0 and f 2 F 0 such that M (w) = f 0 and
(for any unmatched worker and …rm, at least one of them prefers not to be matched to the other).
Best response correspondence: …rms
In any equilibrium, …rm f makes a job o¤er at stage S = 1 if there exists at least one worker w 2 W such that
and does not make an o¤er if the inequality is reversed for all w 2 W . Since by de…nition P r fw acceptsg = 1 P r fw rejectsg, condition (10) can be restated.
Recall that W 0 q is the set of workers of productivity q that reach stage S = 0 unmatched, and F 0 is the set of …rms that reach stage S = 0 unmatched. By Lemma 1, if high productivity workers are scarce and if no worker who receives a low signal in stage S = 1 is hired
H . Moreover, following condition (3), condition (11) never holds for any worker w such that s w = l, or for any worker w = 2 N f (because the …rm did not receive credible information regarding s w ). Consequently, scarcity of high productivity workers implies that …rm f is better o¤ making a job o¤er at stage S = 1 if and only if f W h 6 = ; and
Let be the fraction of workers hired at stage S = 1. Conditional on ,
To see why the second equality holds, note that for n w ; n f ; W (r) ; F (r) to be consistent with a network structure, it must hold that
Therefore, condition (12) can be rewritten as
and the ex-ante probability that a randomly chosen …rm with degree r makes an o¤er at stage S = 1 , conditional on f W h 6 = ; and the expectation that = 1 , is
Best response correspondence: workers
In any equilibrium, worker w accepts a job o¤er at stage S = 1 if there exists at least one …rm f 2 e F w such that
and does not accept any job o¤er if the inequality is reversed. Combining Lemma 1 and the observation that a worker w does not receive an early o¤er unless s w = h, condition (15) can be simpli…ed to
Pick an edge (f; w) 2 E u.a.r. If all workers expect = 1 , then the ex-ante probability that condition (16) holds for (f; w) is G;M; ( ) = G(nw; W ; F );M; r w ; e F w ;
Recall that H is continuous. Thus, G;M; ( ) is the induced probability that a worker that received exactly one job o¤er at stage 1 accepts the o¤er. Similarly, a worker that received exactly m o¤ers at stage S = 1 accepts an o¤er with probability 1 1 G;M; ( ) m .
Conditional on accepting an o¤er, worker w solves the following maximization problem to decide which o¤er to accept:
M ax f 2 e Fw 1 + wf
Proofs
Lemma 2 Let h W ; F ; i exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, and let b G ( W ; F ; n w ) be any network that is consistent with W ; F and n w . Assume further that no worker who receive a low signal in stage S = 1 is hired early (in stage S = 1). Let n b G( W ; F ;nw) w (H; 0; ) be a random variable (r.v.) that captures the number of workers of high productivity that are not hired in stage S = 1 and let n b G( W ; F ;nw) f (0; ) be a r.v. that captures the number of …rms that did not hire in stage S = 1. Then, there exist > 0 such that
Proof. Let p 
where the inequality holds because p
is the proportion of workers who receive high signal and are not hired at stage S = 1. This equals the proportion of workers that receive high signal, are of high productivity, and are not hired at stage S = 1 only if all of the high signal workers who are not hired at stage S = 1 are also of high productivity.
By the strong law of large numbers
Thus, inequality (20) implies that,
By the assumption of scarcity of high productivity workers for every
there exists > 1 such that n f > 1 2 n w . Consequently,
Combining (21) and (22) and some algebra yields that there exists > 1 such that,
(H; 0), and since ( 1) 1 2 > 0, the proof is complete.
Lemma 1 -Proof. The proof of part 1 of the Lemma is immediate from the de…nitions above. The proof for part 2 is as follows:
Let z (w; F 0 ; ; ) ff 2 F 0 j j1 + wf (1 + )j < g and denote the empty set by ?. For given 2 [0; 1], and > 0 consider the following algorithm:
While W 6 = ? and F 6 = ? Select w 2 W uniformly at random If z (w; F; ; ) 6 = ? Pick a …rm f 2 z (w; F; ; ) uniformly at random Match w to f Let W = Wnw and F = Fnf Otherwise Pick a …rm f 2 F uniformly at random Match w to f Let W = Wnw and F = Fnf
The algorithm matches a …rm and a worker at every iteration and therefore always stops when either W 6 = ? or F 6 = ? and provides a stable matching. The probability distribution over the outcomes of the algorithm is a matching procedure M (W 0 ; F 0 ). The anonymity of the procedure is directly implied by the randomness in the selection of the worker and the …rm out of the relevant sets.
It is left to show that for every w 2 W that is selected by the algorithm and any F that is reached by the algorithm given a network b G ( W ; F ; n w ),
Let n b G( W ; F ;nw) w (H; 0) be a r.v. that captures the number of workers of high productivity that are not hired at stage S = 1 and let n b G( W ; F ;nw) f (0) be a r.v. that captures the number of …rms that did not hire at stage S = 1. Then, by Lemma 2 there exists > 0 such that
Let jAj be the number of elements in a set A. For any n w and at every iteration of the algorithm, jFj n b G( W ; F ;nw) f (0; ) n b G( W ; F ;nw) w (H; 0; ), and this holds with equality only when the last worker e w 2 W is chosen by the algorithm. As a result, there exists > 0 such that when a random worker w 2 W is chosen by the algorithm
To complete the proof, …x > 0 and > 0, and consider a randomly selected worker e w and a set e F (n w ) of n w …rms that is chosen independently of the worker's preferences. Let B (n w ) be the event that there is no …rm e f 2 e F (n w ) such that 1 + e w e f
(1 + ) < . Recall that e w e f is distributed H with positive density in every point in the support
nw and lim nw!1 P r (B (n w )) = 0
It is only left to recall that when there is no …rm e f 2 e F (n w ) such that 1 + e w e f
(1 + ) < , e wf is bounded.
De…nition 12 For two random variables (r.v.) X; Y with support on some countably in…nite set X , the total variational distance between X and Y , T V D(X; Y ), is de…ned as P x2X jP r(X = x) P r(Y = x)j. Proof. Following condition (3) and the discussion in sections 9.2 and 9.3, a worker w has a positive probability to be hired at stage S = 1 only if s w = h and r w 1. Consider a network G. Select worker w u.a.r. and then select a …rm f 2 N w u.a.r. Let G;M; ( ) be the probability that f makes an early o¤er to w if s w = h. Recall that the realization (q w ; s w ) is independent of anything else, then by Lemma 3, which in turn, together with the independence of f wf g f 2F and Lemma 3 imply that as n w ! 1 the probability that w receives at least one early o¤er (at S = 1) that she would like to accept, conditional on s w = h, converges to 1 (1 e W ; F ;M; ( )) + e W ; F ;M; ( ) 1 e W ; F ;M; rw For a given graph G let b w h (G) be a r.v. that captures the number of workers in the set c W h (G) = fw 2 W jr w 1 and s w = hg and let
. The probability that a randomly chosen worker
The proof is then completed by applying the strong law of large numbers twice to establish that (1) P r lim nw!1 x W (G) = 1 2 W = 1 and (2) for any r, P r lim nw!1 P c W (rjG (n w ; W ; F )) = P (r; W ) = 1.
Theorem 1 -Proof. By the convexity of the support for and the continuity of e W ; F ;M; ( ) a …xed point exists.
We now show that if = e W ; F ;M; ( ) then is a 0-equilibrium with h W ; F ; M; i. The proof goes in two steps. First, Lemma 4 implies that for any > 0 there exists n w such that for any n 0 w > n w , Pr G(nw; W ; F );M; ( ) 2 [
; + ] > 1 . Second, we are required to show that for any " > 0 there exists such that for any 0 < , workers'and …rms'best responses for satisfy the conditions for an "-equilibrium for any 2 [ 0 ; + 0 ]. The latter follows from the continuity (and independence of n w ) of the conditions on …rms'and workers'decisions (equations 13 and 16).
Since the payo¤s of workers and …rms are bounded, Step 2 completes the proof that if = e W ; F ;M; ( ) then is a 0-equilibrium with h W ; F ; M; i. We are left to show that if is a 0-equilibrium with h W ; F ; M; i then = e W ; F ;M; ( ). Assume by contradiction that = e W ; F ;M; ( ) + { for some { 6 = 0. Then by Lemma 4 and following the argument from step 1 above, for any > 0 there exists n w such that for any n 0 w > n w , Pr G(nw; W ; F );M; ( ) 2 [ + { ; + { + ] > 1 . As a result, there exist 1 > 0 and n w such that for any n ( ). To reduce the notation that we carry throughout the proof, …x W ; F ; M; , and and let e = e W ; F ;M; ( ), e = e W ; F ;M; ( ), = W ; F ;M; ( ), e = e W ; F ;M; , and x = e . We can drop the argument since a claim of greater di¤usion is proved by a shift in e W ; F ;M; ( ) for every 2 [0; 1] and since and e (and x) are independent of and therefore can be treated of as exogenous for a given . Substituting in the de…nitions of e and x and some algebra yields, Thus to prove Proposition 1 it is su¢ cient to show that:
Step 1: ' 2 (r w ; 1) ' 1 (r w ; 1).
Step 2 As a result, condition (37) is satis…ed for any x > 0, and inequality (33) holds for any x 0 as required. 
